<text id=00he1801><title>A Decade to Change Minds</title>
<history>US Air Force: Events History</history>
<article><hdr>A Decade to Change Minds</hdr><body>
<p>Ten years after the JCS had written that Indochina was " ... devoid of military objectives ... " they prepared a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In the opinion of the JCS, the United States should escalate its efforts in Indochina, the memo said. The first step would be the gathering of intelligence by flights over Cambodia and Laos. That would be followed by arming, equipping, advising and supporting the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) so that the RVN air force (RVNAF) could bomb North Vietnam and mine its sea approaches. Finally, the US should bomb specific targets in North Vietnam, using US aircraft with Vietnamese markings and with Vietnamese open assumption of responsibility for the action.
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<p>That memo was dated 22 January 1964. Less than two months later, McNamara sent a memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson that went further. He called for retaliation that would include open reconnaissance over North Vietnam and air attacks against military, possibly industrial, targets in the North. To do that task, McNamara suggested that the RVNAF be augmented by the USAF Farm Gate unit, and that the Farm Gate squadron be reinforced by three squadrons of Martin B-57s.
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<p>Clandestine military operations had begun in the North during February, under Operations Plan 34. and by April the Joint Chiefs were developing a target list that ultimately included 94 potential bombing objectives in North Vietnam. The 1st Air Command Wing had sent its Detachment 6 to Udorn, Thailand, to assist in Laotian air operations, to check out Laotian pilots in the North American T-28, and to maintain the planes. Their four T-28s and 41 airmen were ready for operations with the Laos in April.
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<p>In May, General Khanh, one of the many South Vietnamese leaders who followed in the turbulent wake of the unsuccessful Diem regime, asked that the United States attack the North. The pressure to escalate began; Khanh's request was only one of several factors.
